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Christensen v. Harris County: Pumping Chevron
For All It's Worth - Defining the Limits of
Chevron Deference
NAAMAN ASIR FIOLA*
I. INTRODUCTION
One commentator called the Supreme Court's decision in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.' "the central case of modem administrative law."2 Not
surprisingly, scholars have produced countless studies re-
garding the influence of Chevron.' One issue scholars have
focused on is the considerable uncertainty as to how far
so-called Chevron deference extends.' Stated another way,
under what circumstances should administrative agencies,
rather than the courts, definitively interpret federal stat-
utes?5 While the Court in Chevron deferred to a statutory
* Second-year law student at Pepperdine University School of Law.
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and
Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN L.J. Am. U. 187 (1992); cf. Gregory E.
Maggs, Reconciling Textualism and the Chevron Doctrine: In Defense of Jus-
tice Scalia, 28 CONN. L. REV. 393, 400 (1996) (asserting that: "The Chevron
case did not revolutionize the field of administrative law. Many earlier
precedents had indicated that courts should defer to administrative agen-
cies.").
3. See infra notes 2-7.
4. See MICHAEL ASIMOV ET AL., STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
566 (2d ed. 1998) (asking whether "Chevron appl[ies] to every agency inter-
pretation, regardless of format"); see also Britt E. Ide, To Defer or Not to De-
fer9? The Circuit Split Over Chevron Deference to Agency Interpretations:
Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Production Co., 1998 UTAH L. REV. 397
(1998) (stating that "[tihe law regarding the level of deference courts give to
an administrative agency's interpretation that is neither a rulemaking nor
an adjudication is in disarray").
5. See Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind
Citizens and the Courts, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 2 (1990); see also Cynthia R.
Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administra-
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interpretation contained in a legislative rule,6 administra-
tive agencies use a wide variety of formats to interpret ad-
ministrative legislation.7 The different interpretive formats
may be placed into three different categories: (1) legislative
rules having the binding effect of a statute; (2) binding
principles announced in adjudicative proceedings; and (3)
non-legislative rules lacking legal authority to bind the
public or courts.8 Under Chevron, the first two categories
of agency interpretations are clearly entitled to judicial def-
erence.9 Some courts have extended Chevron-deference to
the third category of agency interpretations, such as opin-
ion letters,10 guidelines and manuals,"1 informational bulle-
tins and memoranda, 12 policy statements,13 and interpre-
tive regulations, 14 to name just a few. 1 5 Lower courts have
tive State, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 452, 452 (1989) (stating that "one of the most
persistently intriguing puzzles has been to define the appropriate judicial
and administrative roles in the interpretation of regulatory statutes").
6. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840-41.
7. See Anthony, supra note 5, at 2 (identifying legislative rules, adjudi-
catory opinions, procedural rules and actions, interpretive rules, policy
statements, manuals, guidelines, staff instructions, opinion letters, and
other formats that agencies use to interpret statutes).
8. Patricia G. Chapman, Has the Chevron Doctrine Run Out of Gas?
Senza Ripieni Use of Chevron Deference or the Rule of Lenity, 19 Miss. C.L.
REv. 115, 123-24 (1998).
9. See United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 394 (1999)
(stating that courts "must, when appropriate, give [agency] regulations
Chevron deference"); see also INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425
(1999) (explaining that courts must apply Chevron principles to adjudicative
decisions of an agency that has been delegated ultimate decision making
authority in a particular area).
10. Almendarez v. Barrett-Fisher Co., 762 F.2d 1275, 1281-82 (5th Cir.
1985); see also Techworld Dev. Corp. v. D.C. Pres. League, 648 F. Supp.
106, 121 (D.D.C. 1986).
11. Friends of the Shawangunks, Inc. v. Clark, 754 F.2d 446, 450 (2d
Cir. 1985).
12. Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 377-78 (1987); Cook Inlet Native
Ass'n v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1471, 1474-76 (9th Cir. 1987).
13. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 778
F.2d 850, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
14. Wis. Dep't of Health and Soc. Servs. v. Bowen, 797 F.2d 391, 397-
98 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Am. Med. Ass'n v. Heckler, 606 F. Supp. 1422,
1441 (S.D. Ind. 1985) (upholding interpretation of the Deficit Reduction Act
as reasonable); Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d
170, 182 (3rd Cir. 1995) (deferring to informally promulgated agency statu-
tory interpretation).
15. But see Capitano v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 732 F.2d
also created almost a netherworld of Chevron deference; os-
tensibly giving informal interpretations less than "full
Chevron deference,"1 6 but in reality deferring to less formal
interpretations. 7 Adding to the confusion regarding the
reach of Chevron, the Supreme Court itself has been incon-
sistent in deciding whether informal interpretations are en-
titled to Chevron deference,18 and at other times, the Court
sidestepped the issue entirely. 9 However, the Supreme
Court's decision in Christensen v. Harris County"° should
send a signal to lower courts that informal agency interpre-
tations are not entitled to Chevron deference. 1
The purpose of this article is to analyze the Christensen
case and determine the influence it should have on lower
courts. This note will briefly trace the history of judicial
deference of agency interpretations, from pre-Chevron ju-
risprudence through the present. Subsequently, this note
will attempt to predict the influence Christensen will have
on lower courts, and on the administrative agencies them-
selves.
1066, 1076 (2d Cir. 1984) (declining to defer under Chevron because the
regulation was not legislative); accord Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of United
States, Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d 521,
535 (2d Cir. 1994) (refusing to give Chevron deference to an EPA "Advisory
Circular" after concluding that the circular was not a "regulation").
16. Massachusetts v. FDIC, 102 F.3d 615, 621 (1st Cir. 1996).
17. Id. at 621-22.
18. See Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 499
U.S. 144, 157 (1991) (indicating that informal interpretations are only enti-
tled to "some weight"); see also Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S.
471, 481, 482 (1999) (declining to defer to interpretive guidelines); but see
Lukhard, 481 U.S. at 378-79 (deferring to agency interpretation found in
memoranda); Nations Bank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.,
513 U.S. 251, 256-57 (1995) (deferring to the opinion letter of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency).
19. City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 339 (1994).
20. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
21. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 577 (2000) (stating
that "[interpretations such as those in opinion letters ... like interpreta-
tions contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines, all of which lack the force of law - do not warrant Chevron-style
deference").
Spring 2001 Christensen v. Harris County 1L53
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Pre-Chevron deference
Prior to Chevron, courts did not articulate a systematic or
consistent doctrine regarding deference that should be ac-
corded to an agency's interpretation of legislation it was
charged with administering.2 2 One commentator asserts
that the Supreme Court's first attempt at establishing
guidelines for deference to agency interpretations 23 resulted
in deference to the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB)
interpretation.24 Three years later, the Supreme Court
reached the opposite conclusion, holding that the NLRB's
adjudicative opinions addressing whether company fore-
persons could be classified as "employees" were not entitled
to deference.2" Thus, the Court established a pattern of
wavering between strong and weak deference that would
last for over forty years.26
One leading pre-Chevron case is Skidmore v. Swift &
Co.,27 which, even after Chevron, remained "Itihe authorita-
tive statement on the role of interpretive rules in adminis-
trative law. '28  In Skidmore, Swift employed plaintiffs to
maintain the fire-fighting equipment of the company, oper-
ate the elevators, and relieve other employees of their fire-
22. See Anthony, supra note 5, at 6; see also Russel L. Weaver and
Thomas A. Schweitzer, Deference to Agency Interpretations of Regulations: A
Post-Chevron Assessment, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 411, 413 (1992) (pointing
out that "[iln the pre-Chevron era, the Supreme Court applied diverse defer-
ence standards to interpretations of regulations").
23. NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
24. Id. at 135. See also John G. Osborn, Legal Philosophy and Judicial
Review of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 36 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 115, 116
(1999).
25. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 492 (1947) (stating
that "[ilf we were obliged to depend upon administrative interpretation for
light in finding the meaning of the statute, the inconsistency of the Board's
decisions would leave us in the dark").
26. Osborn, supra note 24, at 116.
27. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
28. Jamie A. Yavelberg, The Revival of Skidmore v. Swift: Judicial Defer-
ence to Agency Interpretations After EEOC v. Aramco, 42 DuKE L.J. 166
(1992) (arguing that "Skidmore established a doctrine of 'cautious defer-
ence' regarding agency interpretations").
pen
fighting duties.29 Under the terms of their employment,
plaintiffs agreed to stay overnight at Swift three to four
nights a week in order to answer fire alarms.3 ° The plain-
tiffs, in addition to their fixed compensation, were initially
paid fifty cents for every alarm answered," but during their
time of employment there were few alarms and no fires.32
The employees claimed that they were entitled to overtime
compensation for the nights they had spent on the com-
pany premises and brought an action under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA) to recover overtime, liquidated dam-
ages, and attorney's fees." Swift, bolstered by the Labor
Administrator's interpretations of the FLSA, claimed that
the nights spent by the employees at the company did not
constitute work.34 This interpretation meant that the em-
ployees were not entitled to overtime compensation under
the FLSA.35
The Supreme Court held that the interpretations and
opinions of the Labor Administrator were "entitled to re-
spect," but were "not controlling on the courts." 31
Skidmore established a doctrine of "cautious deference" to
agency interpretations.3 7 In contrast, Chevron required
"deference to any reasonable agency interpretations."
38
According to Justice Antonin Scalia, pre-Chevron courts
asked whether "(1) Congress intended a particular result,
but was not clear about it; or (2) Congress had no particu-
lar intent on the subject, but meant to leave its resolution
to the agency."39 If the former situation applied, then the
29. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 135.
30. Id.
31. This amount was later increased to sixty-four cents per alarm. Id.
at 135-36.
32. Id. at 135.
33. Id.
34. The trial court found for the company and held that as a "conclu-
sion of law" the employees were not entitled to overtime. Id. at 136.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Yavelberg, supra note 28, at 166.
38. Id.
39. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations
of Law, 1989 DuKE L.J. 511, 516 (1989).
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courts asserted their right to interpret the law.4 ° If the lat-
ter situation arose, courts deferred to the agency.41 Inter-
estingly, the level of deference accorded to an agency inter-
pretation of Congressional legislation often turned on the
format of the interpretation. 42 Thus, courts deferred to in-
terpretational formats having "the force of law," as long as
they were reasonable, and accorded only "special consid-
eration" to less formal formats.4 3 Although courts have de-
ferred to agency interpretations contained in legislative
regulations and expressed in adjudicative decisions,44 ordi-
narily, agency interpretations "[were] given important but
not controlling significance. " 41
B. Post-Chevron
According to the Supreme Court's opinion in Chevron,
courts must defer to an administrative agency's regulation
containing a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous
statute.46 Chevron involved the application of the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1977.47 The amended Act required
states that had not achieved the national air quality stan-
dards established by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to implement a "permit program regulating new or
modified major stationary sources of air pollution."4  Un-
der the program, states could not issue permits unless
stringent conditions were met.49 The EPA interpreted "sta-
tionary source" to mean a single plant, regardless of the
number of pollution-emitting devices the plant had. ° This
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Anthony, supra note 5, at 7.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 7-8.
45. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 424 (1977).
46. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984) (citing INS v. Wong, 450 U.S. 139, 144 (1981); Train v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 87 (1978)).
47. Id. at 839.
48. Id. at 840.
49. Id.
50. Id.
Spin 201Crsesnv arsCut
interpretation was contained in an EPA regulation. l Pur-
suant to this interpretation, an existing plant with several
pollution-emitting devices could install or modify one piece
of equipment without meeting the stringent conditions, as
long as the total emissions fell under the maximum allow-
able. 2 The issue in Chevron was whether the EPA's inter-
pretation of "stationary source" was based on a "reasonable
construction" of the amended Clean Air Act. 3 To answer
this question, the Court first addressed the question of
whether Congress' intent regarding the meaning of "sta-
tionary source" could be ascertained.5 4 Finding that nei-
ther the statute itself nor the legislative history was clear
on the meaning of "stationary source," the Court then ana-
lyzed the issue of the reasonableness of the EPA's interpre-
tation.55 The Court concluded that the EPA's definition of
"stationary source" represented a reasonable construction
of the statute. 6
It might seem obvious to state, but Chevron deference
represents a "substantial departure from pre-Chevron case
law."57 Whereas prior to Chevron, the Court ruled that an
agency's "rulings, interpretations, and opinions" need not
be "controlling,"58 Chevron mandates that courts defer to
reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.
Chevron deference to an agency's interpretation requires
two levels of analysis.' First, the court must decide
whether the statute has a clear meaning.6 1 If the statute is
51. Id.
52. Id. at 840.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 845-47.
55. Id. at 865.
56. Id.
57. Weaver and Schweitzer, supra note 22, at 418. See also Thomas W.
Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 971
(1992) (stating that "Chevron is widely understood to mark a significant
transformation in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of deference"); Farina,
supra note 5, at 455 (pointing out that Chevron "announced the end of judi-
cial vacillation between [differing] interpretive models").
58. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
59. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
60. Id.
61. ASIMOV, ET AL., supra note 4, at 565.
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clear, the court and the agency must implement the intent
of Congress.62 An agency's interpretation that conflicts
with the clear meaning of the statute is presumptively inva-
lid. 3 If the statute is ambiguous, the court moves to the
next level of analysis: whether the agency interpretation is
"permissible" or "reasonable."6 4 The court "may not substi-
tute its own construction of a statutory provision for a rea-
sonable interpretation" of an agency.65 Where Congress
has spoken, "its will must prevail."66 When Congress has
not addressed the disputed issue, courts must presume
that Congress has delegated interpretive authority to the
agency.67 Courts may interpret ambiguous law if Congress
"has failed to designate an agency to administer the stat-
ute."68
Some see Chevron as an "enormous improvement" over
judicial decision-making in the pre-Chevron era.6 9  Dis-
putes regarding the interpretation of statutes should be re-
solved by agencies themselves because Congress has dele-
gated its policy making power to the agency in its
particular sphere of expertise.7" Chevron is based in part
on the premise that "the agency responsible for administer-
ing a regulatory scheme is often in the best position to in-
terpret that scheme."71 The reasoning behind this premise
is that the responsible agency possesses expertise and is
politically accountable to the public.72 Moreover, adminis-
trative agencies function just as well as the courts in inter-
preting legislation to comport with changing times.73
62. Anthony, supra note 5, at 16.
63. ASIMOV, ET AL., supra note 4, at 565.
64. Id.
65. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
66. Merrill, supra note 57, at 979.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 1 KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE 112 (3d ed. 1994).
70. Id. at 112-14.
71. Weaver and Schweitzer, supra note 22, at 419.
72. Jonathon T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative
State: Reconciling Modem Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary's Struc-
tural Role, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1, 100-01 (2000).
73. Cass Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as
Others, however, view Chevron deference as a wrongful
usurpation of the judiciary's power to interpret the law,74
due to the fact that "Jilt is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to 'say what the law is."'75
Regardless of how one feels about Chevron deference, it
seems clear that it has strengthened agency power76 be-
cause Chevron replaced the old case-by-case analysis with
a rigid formula for giving deference to the agency's posi-
tion.77
It is important to note that the Court in Chevron deferred
to an agency interpretation contained in a legislative regu-
lation.78 There is a fundamental difference between legisla-
tive and interpretive (or non-legislative) rules.79 Legislative
rules derive from a Congressional grant of authority to the
agency, and have the binding effect of a statute.8 ° In con-
Common Law Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1019 (1998) (stating that
"[olperating as common law courts, agencies have, as they should, consid-
erable power to adapt statutory language to changing understandings and
circumstances").
74. Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2074-75 (1990).
75. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also
Molot, supra note 72, at 6 (arguing that "[Chevron] weaken[s] judicial au-
thority in a way that fundamentally alters the relationship between lawmak-
ing and law interpretation in our constitutional framework").
76. Anthony, supra note 5, at 27; see also Lars Noah, Interpreting
Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced Metaphors in Administrative Law, 41 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1463, 1466 (2000) (observing that "the judiciary's rush to
defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory language
has emboldened agencies to push the outer limits of their jurisdiction");
Keith Werhan, The Neoclassical Revival in Administrative Law, 44 ADMIN. L.
REV. 567 (1992) (noting that courts have upheld significantly more agency
decisions after Chevron).
77. David M. Hasen, The Ambigous Basis of Judicial Deference to Ad-
ministrative Rules, 17 YALE L.J. ON REG. 327, 336 (2000) (stating that, "[iun
place of a context-sensitive inquiry into deference factors, courts now [are]
required to fit the widely varying circumstances of agency rulemaking into
Chevron's rather rigid decision tree").
78. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 840 (1984).
79. Yavelberg, supra note 28, at 167; see generally Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretive Rules, 2 ADMIN L. REv.
547 (2000); cf. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that post-Chevron, the "legislative rules vs. other action
dichotomy.., is an anachronism"), overruled by Civil Rights Act of 1991.
80. Yavelberg, supra note 28, at 167-68.
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trast, agencies may issue interpretive rules without relying
on a Congressional grant of power."' An agency may issue
this type of rule in a variety of formats, including manuals,
policy statements, staff instructions, opinion letters, au-
dits, correspondence, guidelines, press releases, and inter-
nal memoranda." Post-Chevron courts often gave Chevron-
deference to agency interpretations that did not have the
same force as a legislative rule.8
A brief review of Supreme Court cases that applied Chev-
ron shows that the Court has at times given deference to
agency interpretations found in a variety of formats. Just
two years after Chevron, the Court in Young v. Community
Nutrition Institute4 deferred to a "longstanding interpreta-
tion" found in Food and Drug Administration (FDA) pol-
icy.85 In Reno v. Koray86 the Court likewise deferred to a
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) policy interpreting "official deten-
tion"87 as excluding time spent out of prison on bail.88
Paradoxically, the Reno Court indicated in dicta that a BOP
internal agency guideline was only entitled to "some defer-
ence."89 The Court has also applied Chevron deference to
an agency interpretation found in a legal brief prepared for
litigation.9°
However, Christensen revisits the issue of applying Chev-
ron non-legislative rules, and finds that Chevron should not
81. Id. at 168.
82. Id.
83. Arnold v. UPS, Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 864 (1st Cir. 1998); but see S.
Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 119 F.3d 816, 832 (10th Cir. 1997)(finding that Chevron should not be applied to less formal agency interpre-
tations), rev'd, 526 U.S. 865 (1999).
84. 476 U.S. 974 (1986).
85. Id. at 979-81; see also PBGC v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 656(1990) (holding that PBGC's policy of restoring certain pension plans under
section 4047 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ER-
ISA) was a "permissible construction" of that statute).
86. 515 U.S. 50 (1995).
87. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (2000).
88. Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995).
89. Id. at 61.
90. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997) (explaining that: "There
is simply no reason to suspect that the interpretation [contained in the legal
brief] does not reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment on the mat-
ter in question.").
be applied in this context.91
III. ANALYSIS OF CHRISTENSEN V. HARRIS CouNTY
Until Christensen, it was unclear whether Chevron defer-
ence extended to informal agency interpretive formats such
as interpretive rules or opinion letters.92 While pre-Chevron
jurisprudence placed an emphasis on the distinction be-
tween formal and informal interpretations in determining
how much deference to give, post-Chevron decisions
blurred the distinctions between formal and informal inter-
pretations.9 This resulted in confusion as to how to apply
Chevron to informal interpretive contexts.94
Christensen addresses the issue of whether Chevron def-
erence extends to an administration agency's opinion letter
interpreting a regulation the agency has promulgated.9
In Christensen, Harris County adopted a policy requiring
its employees to schedule time off in order to reduce the
amount of accrued compensatory time.96 The County, con-
cerned that it lacked the monetary resources to pay the ac-
crued compensatory time, sought a determination from the
Department of Labor regarding the legality of its position.97
The Department replied to the County in an opinion letter,
stating that the County could not require its non-exempt
employees to take time off.98 The County, meanwhile, went
ahead with its previously formulated policy of ordering its
91. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587-88 (2000).
92. ASIMOV ET AL., supra note 4, at 566.
93. Chapman, supra note 8, at 125.
94. Id.
95. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 581.
96. Id. at 580-81.
97. Id.
98. Id. The Opinion Letter stated:
[I]t is our position that a public employer may schedule its nonexempt em-
ployees to use their accrued FLSA compensatory time as directed if the
prior agreement specifically provides such a provision ... Absent such an
agreement, it is our position that neither the statute nor the regulations
permit an employer to require an employee to use accrued compensatory
time.
Dep't of Labor, Wage and Hourly Division (Sept. 12, 1992).
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employees to use the compensatory time.99 The County
employees sued, claiming that the FLSA of 1938 prohibited
the county from implementing a policy of forcing their em-
ployees to take time off in order to reduce compensatory
time. 100
After a somewhat detailed explanation of the substantive
law of the FLSA, the Court held that nothing in the FLSA
prohibited the County from implementing its policy of
forced time off. 101 More importantly, the Court engaged in
a Chevron analysis and did not defer to the Department of
Labor's opinion letter interpreting its own regulation.'02
In Part III of its opinion, the Court directly confronts the
Chevron issue. 103 The Court points Out the substantive dif-
ference between an informal interpretation, such as the
opinion letter at issue here, and interpretations arrived at
after formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing. 1°4 The Court alludes to its previous decisions holding
that interpretive guidelines do not receive Chevron defer-
ence, and proceeds to explicitly state that "interpretations
such as those in opinion letters - like interpretations con-
tained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforce-
ment guidelines, all of which lack the force of law - do not
warrant Chevron-style deference."105 The Court goes back
to a pre-Chevron demarcation between formal and informal
interpretations, while affirming the Chevron doctrine it-
self. 106
Perhaps the most fascinating portion of the Court's ma-
jority opinion addresses the question of ambiguity of the
FLSA regulation.107 As is well settled under Chevron, the
Court must first ask whether the statute or regulation has
99. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 581.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 587-88.
102. Id. at 586-87.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 587.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 587-88.
107. Id. at 588.
a clear meaning. °8 If so, the investigation ends; inquiry
into the reasonableness of the agency's interpretation is
superfluous. 9 Initially, the Court addresses the question
of the agency's interpretation, holding that it is not entitled
to deference, and subsequently finds that the FLSA regula-
tion is unambiguous."' The Court found that even if the
Opinion Letter was entitled to Chevron deference, the regu-
lation was clear in its meaning, thereby precluding any in-
terpretation contrary to the clear meaning of the regula-
tion. 11' The order of the Court's Chevron analysis is telling.
The fact that the Court reverses the order of the "Chevron
two-step" patently displays the Court's desire to definitively
answer the question of whether informal interpretations of
statutes or regulations should be allowed Chevron defer-
ence. 112 The answer to the question is a resounding "no. "113
Justice Souter writes separately to emphasize his opinion
that the Secretary of Labor could, if so inclined, issue a
regulation limiting forced use of time off in order to cut
down on compensation." 4  He reinforces the majority's
holding that regulations, adopted pursuant to notice-and-
comment procedures, are entitled to Chevron deference." 5
Thus, if the Secretary issued such a regulation it would
presumably change the result arrived at in Christensen.116
Justice Scalia's concurrence raises several interesting
arguments regarding the proper scope of Chevron defer-
ence."' Justice Scalia, a former administrative law profes-
sor, frequently authors opinions and writes articles con-
cerning the issue of Chevron deference.' 18 It is safe tn say
108. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842 (1984).
109. Id.
110. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587-88.
111. Id. at 588.
112. Id. (enunciating the Court's Chevron analysis as set forth above
and stating that "[t]he regulation in this case.., is not ambiguous").
113. William Funk, Supreme Court News, 25 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEws 8,
9-17 (2000).
114. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 589.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 589-91.
118. See, e.g. Scalia, supra note 39; EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499
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that Scalia strongly supports Chevron deference.'l 9 More-
over, he makes known his desire to extend Chevron to all
agency interpretations, regardless of format. 2 He asserts
that "[while Chevron in fact involved an interpretive regula-
tion, the rationale of that case was not limited to that con-
text ..... 121 One reason undergirding Scalia's support of
Chevron is his desire to prompt Congress to create unam-
biguous legislation. 122 He also agrees with those who be-
lieve that, due to their superior knowledge, administrative
agencies are in a better position to interpret ambiguous
legislation than the courts. 123 According to Scalia, agencies
that are accountable to the President have a better "democ-
ratic pedigree" than the courts. 124 In other words, courts
are often insulated from public views, while agencies are,
theoretically, accountable to the public.
Justice Scalia restates his case for the widespread appli-
cation of Chevron.125 He reasons that the agency's opinion
letter is entitled to deference "if it represents the authorita-
tive view" of the agency.126 Scalia concedes that the letter,
by itself, does not necessarily represent the "authoritative
view,"127 however, he argues that an amicus curiae brief
U.S. 244, 259-60 (1991) (Scalla, J., concurring); Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S.
452 (1997) (upholding Secretary of Labor's reading of the FLSA).
119. Herz, supra note 2, at 187 n.4; see generally Maggs, supra note 2.
120. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 259-60 (Scalia, J., concurring)(stating that the distinction between formal and informal interpretations is
"an anachronism"); but see Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health Re-
view Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 157 (1991) (reiterating the distinction between
formal interpretive rules, entitled to Chevron deference, and informal inter-
pretations, which are only entitled to "some weight" under Skidmore).
121. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 589-90.
122. Scalia, supra note 39, at 517 (stating that "Congress now knows
that the ambiguities it creates, whether intentionally or unintentionally, will
be resolved, within the bounds of permissible interpretation, not by the
courts but by a particular agency, whose policy biases will ordinarily be
known").
123. Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE
L. J. 529, 551 (1997) (reviewing Antonin Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw (1997)).
124. Id.
125. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 591 (Scalia, J., concurring).
126. Id.
127. Id.
filed by the United States Solicitor General,'28 purporting to
endorse an opinion letter as the authoritative view, should
be enough to merit Chevron deference. 1
29
Ultimately, Scalia's "authoritative view" argument raises
more questions than it answers. How is "authoritative
view" defined? Who is authorized to express the agency's
"authoritative view" on a particular subject? If there are
conflicting interpretations of a statute or regulation, does
the court step in and choose which interpretation repre-
sents the "authoritative view?"'3  Unlike the majority's
formulation of Chevron's applicability, Scalia's approach
engenders the same confusion and lack of uniformity that
has plagued the courts since Chevron was decided. 131
Justice Scalia's desire to extend Chevron is equaled by
Justice Breyer's desire to consign Chevron to a mere appli-
cation of Skidmore.3 ' Breyer argues that Chevron "simply
focused upon an additional, separate legal reason for defer-
ring to certain agency determinations."3 3 Ironically, Breyer
agrees with Scalia that the agency's position is entitled to
deference. 34  His rationale, however, represents a funda-
mental disagreement with Scalia about the nature of Chev-
ron, because he believes that Scalia's approach is "counter-
productive." 131 While Scalia would apply Chevron deference
128. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae supporting Petition-
ers, (1999 WL 112 8266).
129. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 591.
130. The Court did exactly that in Martin, where the Court had to
choose between "reasonable but conflicting interpretations of an ambiguous
regulation" furnished by the Secretary of Labor and the Occupational Safety
and Health Review Commission. Martin, 499 U.S. at 150. Lower courts are
ill-equipped to make such a choice, and should not be forced to do so.
Thus, the rule set forth by the majority in Christensen is the superior view
of Chevron deference.
131. Id.; AsIMoV, ET AL., supra note 4, at 400 (stating that "[t]he Su-
preme Court's holdings addressing deference to agency interpretive state-
ments are unclear and have created confusion... ").
132. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that
"Chevron made no relevant change" to Skidmore's holding that agency "rul-
ings, interpretations and opinions" are "not controlling").
133. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
134. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
135. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38
ADMIN. L. REv. 363, 373 (1986) (stating that "applica[tion] [of Chevron] to all
agency interpretations of law ... would be seriously overbroad, counterpro-
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to any "authoritative view" of an agency, Breyer says the
court should examine each case independently and simply
use the agency interpretation to aid the Court in deciding
the case, rather than rigidly following the Chevron for-
mula.136 In Christensen, Breyer agrees with Justice Ste-
vens' that the agency's opinion letter "merit[s] our re-
spect,"137 and explained that he would have held that the
County's policy violates the FLSA because the agency in-
terpreted the FLSA as prohibiting the County's policy. 138
Justice Stevens' dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer, reaffirms his long-standing belief that Chevron
represents a "restatement of existing law rather than a new
approach." 39 Ironically, while many others view Chevron
as a pivotal moment in the Court's administrative law ju-
risprudence, 4 ' the author of the opinion, Justice Stevens,
regards Chevron as simply one more in a long line of defer-
ence cases.' 4 ' Stevens reads Chevron narrowly in part be-
cause agencies are less accountable to the public than are
legislatures.'4 2 Significantly, Stevens does not cite Chevron
to support the proposition that the Court should defer to
the agency's opinion letter. Instead, he cites to
Skidmore,14 3 which ostensibly allows courts more leeway to
substitute their own judgment for the agency interpreta-
tion. Justice Stevens uses subtle language to illustrate his
support for a narrow reading of Chevron when he points
ductive and sometimes senseless").
136. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 596 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer
places much importance on the Court's Skidmore decision. His extensive
reliance on Skidmore shows his preference for so called "weak deference," as
opposed to Chevron's "strong deference" formulation. But see United States
v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (indicating that he
would extend Chevron deference to an interpretive guideline issued by the
United States Sentencing Commission, a judicial branch agency).
137. Chrisetnsen, 529 U.S. at 597 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
138. See id.
139. Merrill, supra note 57, at 1033 n.33.
140. Farina, supra note 5, at 457 (asserting that Chevron "generated a
powerful new image of the appropriate functions of court and agency in the
administrative state").
141. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 595 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
142. See William D. Popkin, A Common Law Lawyer on the Supreme
Court: The Opinions of Justice Stevens, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1087, 1118 (1989).
143. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 595 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
out that the agency shares his understanding of the stat-
ute's meaning, rather than vice versa." According to Jus-
tice Stevens, the judiciary's understanding of a particular
administrative statute still plays an important role in inter-
preting the statute, even in a post-Chevron determina-
tion. 145 Finally, Chevron and its progenitors simply require
that a court "respect" the agency's interpretation. 4 '
IV. IMPACT OF THE OPINION
A. Future Cases
The Court's refusal to extend Chevron to agency opinion
letters, interpretive rules, and other less formal interpreta-
tions sends a signal to lower courts that they may substi-
tute their own judgment when faced with these types of is-
sues. The courts, of course, can evaluate such informal
interpretations and determine whether or not they are per-
suasive.'47 However, courts should not abdicate their judi-
cial duty and automatically defer to informal agency inter-
pretations analogous to opinion letters, because these
interpretations do not carry the force of law. 4 8 These in-
formal interpretations, which often impose heavy burdens
on the public, are enacted without input from the public. 49
While the judicial principles espoused in Chevron are
sound, courts should be wary of extending its reach be-
yond its "appropriate boundaries."150 On the other hand,
courts must also recognize that even informal agency in-
terpretations are entitled to some deference under
144. See id. at 594 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens writes,
"Finally, it is not without significance in the present case that the Govern-
ment Department responsible for the statute's enforcement shares my un-
derstanding of its meaning." (emphasis added).
145. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
148. Anthony, supra note 5, at 4.
149. Chapman, supra note 8, at 137.
150. See generally Herz, supra note 2, at 187 (arguing that Chevron's
holding creates risk of too much deference).
Christensen v. Harris County. 1L67SvrinR 2001
168 Journal of National Association of Administrative Law Judges 21-1
Skidmore. 1 ' Christensen affirms the Chevron court's
statement that "[tihe judiciary is the final authority on is-
sues of statutory construction ... , ""2
In the aftermath of Christensen, lower courts that have
addressed the issue of deference to agency interpretations
have uniformly recognized the importance of the Christen-
sen decision.1 5 3 One court correctly stated that the Court
in Christensen "appeared to make the interpretation's legal
effect the touchstone" of how much deference the interpre-
tation was entitled to.154 Stated another way, the determi-
nation of whether an agency's interpretation is entitled to
Chevron deference turns on the distinction between infor-
mal and formal interpretations.1 5 5  In District of Columbia
Hospital Ass'n v. District of Columbia,1"6 the court consid-
ered a letter from the General Accounting Office and in-
quired whether the interpretation contained in the letter
was entitled to Chevron deference.1"7 The court quoted at
length from Christensen and recognized that it stands for
the proposition that informal agency interpretations are not
151. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Reno, 215 F.3d 1243, 1245 (11th Cir. 2000)
(stating that "even when Christensen does apply, administrative decisions of
agencies are still due some deference").
152. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 n.9 (1984).
153. See District of Columbia Hosp. Ass'n v. District of Columbia, 224
F.3d 776, 784 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Gonzalez, 215 F.3d at 1245; and Bergerac v.
United States, 102 F. Supp.2d 497, 506 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2000); see also
United States v. Megamania Gambling Devices, 231 F.3d 713, 719 (10th
Cir. 2000) (finding that under Christensen, informal agency interpretations
are entitled to weak deference); Falvo v. Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist., 229 F.3d
957, 969 (10th Cir. 2000), Pub. Serv. Co. v. Colorado v. EPA, 225 F.3d
1144, 1148 (10th Cir. 2000); Bellas v. CBS Inc., 221 F.3d 517, 530 (3d Cir.
2000); Humane Soc. of the United States v. Glickman, 217 F.3d 882, 887
(D.C. Cir. 2000); Coal Traffic League v. Surface Transp. Bd., 216 F.3d 1168,
1177 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court "has
more recently cautioned [in Christensen] that [application of Chevron]
should not be automatic" to informal interpretations).
154. In re Sealed Case, 223 F.3d 775, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2000); but see Es-
den v. Bank of Boston 229 F.3d 154, 169 (2d Cir. 2000) (siding with Scalia's
view that Chevron deference should be accorded to all reasonable agency
interpretations regardless of format).
155. Id.
156. 224 F.3d 776 (D.C. Cr. 2000).
157. Id. at 780.
entitled to Chevron deference."' 8 Furthermore, in a per cu-
riam opinion from the Eleventh Circuit, the court, like the
court in District of Columbia Hospital, concluded that Chris-
tensen represents a limit on the extent of Chevron."9 As al-
luded to in Part II, the Supreme Court applied Chevron def-
erence to an agency interpretation found in a legal brief
prepared for litigation. 6 ° At least one lower court has con-
cluded that Christensen overrules that decision because le-
gal briefs carry the same weight as other informal interpre-
tations, such as opinion letters.' 6 1 One post-Christensen
court ruled that a Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) bulletin was only entitled to some deference under
Christensen and Skidmore. 62  A different court likewise
found that under Christensen, a Labor Department's bulle-
tin is not entitled to Chevron deference." An Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) revenue ruling is not entitled to
Chevron deference, one post-Christensen court has
noted;' 64 neither is an internal agency manual. 165  The
court in Bergerac v. United States16 6 confronted a formal in-
terpretation contained in an agency regulation.167  The
court takes note of Christensen, but ultimately finds that
Christensen does not apply because the case involves a
formal interpretation rather than an informal interpreta-
tion. 16
8
158. Id.
159. Gonzalez, 215 F.3d at 1245.
160. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997).
161. Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., Inc., 228 F.3d 360, 365 (4th Cir.
2000); see also S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, 222 F.3d 819, 828
(10th Cir. 2000) (stating that policy statements, like litigation positions, are
not entitled to Chevron deference); but see Bigelow v. Dep't of Def., 217 F.3d
875, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (misreading Christensen and giving deference to
the Department's interpretation found in its legal brief).
162. Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir. 2000).
163. Bussian v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 223 F.3d 286, 296 (5th Cir. 2000).
164. Dominion Res., Inc. v. United States, 219 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir.
2000).
165. Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2000).
166. 102 F.Supp.2d 497, 506 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2000).
167. Id.
168. Id.
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However, even in the face of Christensen's clear holding,
one court gave deference to a "consistent and reasonable"
IRS interpretation, even though the interpretation was con-
tained in a notice rather than a legislative rule or agency
adjudication. 69
In order to better understand the future influence of
Christensen, it might be helpful to examine a court's recent
attempt to expound upon the Christensen doctrine. Madi-
son v. Resources for Human Development, Inc.,70 may serve
as a model for courts to follow on the deference issue, be-
cause it sets forth a clear and concise statement of Chev-
ron/Christensen deference to agency interpretations.' 7
The issue in Madison was whether a non-profit corpora-
tion providing human services programs for mentally ill
and retarded persons is subject to the FLSA.172 At the
heart of the matter was the construction of the FLSA itself
as interpreted by the Department of Labor.'73 On the one
hand, the court affirmed the district court's decision to give
Chevron deference to the Labor Department's formal regu-
lations defining certain terms contained in the FLSA.'74
Conversely, the court of appeals disapproved of the district
court's treatment of a different Labor Department
interpretation as a "formal interpretation," when in fact it
was not.'75  In fact, the court defined the interpretive
format at issue as "merely an interpretive guideline" of the
Labor Department, rather than a formal interpretation.'7 6
As we have seen, post-Chevron courts often haphazardly
distinguish between "formal" and "informal" agency inter-
pretations. Sometimes courts defer to informal interpreta-
tions, and sometimes they do not. The court in Madison,
however, recognizes the importance of distinguishing be-
169. Esden v. Bank of Boston, 229 F.3d 154, 169 (3d Cir. 2000).
170. 233 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2000).
171. Id. at 186-87.
172. Id. at 178.
173. Id. at 181-87.
174. Id. at 182.
175. Id. at 185.
176. Id. at 185.
tween formal and informal interpretations. 77 Furthermore,
the Madison court endorses the view that somehow infor-
mal interpretations are less legitimate because they are not
subject to the more rigorous procedures called for in formal
regulations. 178
In the wake of Christensen, Madison explains that infor-
mal agency pronouncements still must play a role in aiding
courts to interpret ambiguous legislation.179 However,
Christensen unequivocally stands for the proposition that
this role is limited, and courts should only rely on informal
interpretations to the extent that such interpretations have
the "power to persuade.-
180
The Supreme Court itself has applied Christensen to a
subsequent case and affirmed the principle established in
Christensen that informal interpretations do not warrant
Chevron deference. 181
B. Possible Agency Responses to Christensen
According to one commentator, one aim of the Court in
Christensen was to force agencies to use either notice and
comment rulemaking or adjudications to interpret ambigu-
ous legislation. 82 It remains to be seen whether agencies
will take the hint and issue their interpretations in more
formal contexts, to insure that courts will be required to
give them Chevron deference.
V. CONCLUSION
The approaches of Scalia and Breyer are equally unten-
able. Scalia's approach drastically adds to agency power
by deferring to any reasonable interpretation regardless of
177. Id. (stating that the "formal agency regulations receive more defer-
ence than mere interpretive guidelines").
178. Id. (stating that "[tlo grant Chevron deference to informal agency
interpretations would unduly validate the results of an informal process").
179. Id. at 186-87.
180. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
181. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 1913, 1941 (2000).
182. The Supreme Court, 1999 Term Leading Cases: Federal Preemption
of State Law - Continued, 114 HARv. L. REV. 359, 373-74 (2000).
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format. Breyer, meanwhile, would eviscerate Chevron and
return to a pre-Chevron, case-by-case analysis of the
agency interpretation at issue. The middle ground carved
out by the majority in Christensen, which institutes a clear
rule applying Chevron deference to formal interpretations,
represents the best alternative. The only issue that courts
might have difficulty addressing is determining whether a
particular agency interpretation is "formal" or "informal."
However, courts should follow the lead of many influential
administrative law scholars and only classify regulations
promulgated pursuant to notice and comment rulemaking
as formal interpretations. Moreover, rules issued in adju-
dications should be classified as formal. Other methods of
agency interpretation are not subjected to public scrutiny
and agencies are not required to follow strict procedures to
adopt them. Thus, deferring only to formal interpretations
would force agencies to use strict procedures if they want a
particular interpretation of ambiguous legislation to be fol-
lowed. Otherwise, the supposed advantage that adminis-
trative agencies have over the courts, namely public ac-
countability, would be rendered meaningless.
